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Abstract
This paper studies how learning from neighboring rms a¤ects new exportersperformance.
We develop a statistical decision model in which a rm updates its prior belief about demand
in a foreign market based on several factors, including the number of neighbors currently selling
there, the level and heterogeneity of their export sales, and the rms own prior knowledge
about the market. A positive signal about demand inferred from neighborsexport performance
raises the rms probability of entry and initial sales in the market but, conditional on survival,
lowers its post-entry growth. These learning e¤ects are stronger when there are more neighbors
to learn from or when the rm is less familiar with the market. We nd supporting evidence
for the main predictions of the model from transaction-level data for all Chinese exporters from
2000 to 2006. Our ndings are robust to controlling for rmssupply shocks, countriesdemand
shocks, and city-country xed e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
Research shows that rmsturnover rates (entry and exit) in foreign markets are much higher than
those in the domestic market.1 Moreover, rms often quit exporting to a country after a short
spell of selling a small amount of goods there.2 These ndings reect a considerable amount of
uncertainty facing new exporters. To explain these ndings, theoretical studies have hypothesized
that rms optimally start small in a foreign market, and only after most of the uncertainty is
unveiled do they commit substantial resources to fulll larger orders (e.g., Rauch and Watson,
2003). While self-learning and experimentation are important mechanisms behind these dynamics,
in reality, rms usually try hard to obtain information from their neighbors before undertaking
risky investments (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). This is particularly the case when self-discovery
in export markets entails high sunk costs.3 While development economists have for years studied
how learning from neighbors determines rmstechnology adoption (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig,
1995, 2010; Conley and Udry, 2010), it has been a relatively neglected channel to explain exporters
dynamics and performance.
We develop a model of social learning to study how rms learn from their neighbors about
foreign market demand. The model delivers several micro-founded hypotheses about how learning
from neighbors shapes new exportersentry decisions, survival, initial sales, and post-entry growth,
which we then examine using detailed transaction-level data for all Chinese exporters. In addition
to the rich information available in the data, the especially high degree of industrial agglomeration
in China provides a good setting for such an analysis.
Our model incorporates social learning pioneered by Jovanovic (1982) into a standard heterogeneous-
rm model of trade, starting with Melitz (2003). We think of a rms export prots in a market
as depending on three factors rm-specic productivity, rm-market-specic product appeal, and
market-specic demand. A new exporter knows its productivity before entry, but is uncertain
about country-specic demand and its own market-specic product appeal.4 Based on information
1Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009) found that the average turnover (entry + exit) rate in the domestic
market is 5% for developed nations and 10% for transition economies. The turnover rate in foreign market is several
orders of magnitude bigger, as shown by Eaton, et al. (2008), Albornoz et al. (2011), and Blum et al. (2013). See
the literature review below for a more detailed discussion.
2For example, Eaton et al. (2008) and Albornoz et al. (2012) nd that in Colombia and Argentina respectively,
only 40% to half of new exporters continue to export after the rst year. Firms that survive the rst year of exporting
end up driving the bulk of a countrys long-run export growth.
3Research in international trade has emphasized how high sunk costs of exporting shape export patterns. Das et
al., 2007 and Morales et al., 2011, among others, have provided sizeable estimates of those costs. Notice that high
sunk costs could explain low export entry rate, but not the marjority of small rms among export starters. One
notable exception in the literature is Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008), who show theoretically that neighbors
export activities, by lowering xed export cost, can a¤ect new exportersdynamics. See Section 2 for a comprehensive
literature review.
4While our model focuses on learning about demand, the theoretical results can be generalized and the interpre-
tation of our empirical results can be much broader. For example, learning from neighbors can be about foreign
importers or about how to adapt the product to the specic tastes or legal requirements of the destination market.
We abstract from learning about production, but by no means we think it is unimportant for export. Regarding
the supply-side uncertainty, existing producers would have learned about their own capability by producing for the
domestic market. It is conceptually di¢ cult to explain why rms would enter a foreign market with a small order
and then exit if they are initially uncertain about their production capability.
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inferred from neighborsexport performance in a market, a rm can update its prior about the
markets demand that is common across rms. Since observed neighborsexport performance could
be a¤ected by their unobserved product appeals, signals about foreign market demand are noisy.
Based on a standard learning model, when more neighboring rms reveal information, the observed
signal converges to the true state of demand as rm-specic noises tend to average out to zero.
We show that a rms export decision and post-entry performance depend not only on the
prevalence of neighboring export activities, as has been shown in the literature on information
and technology spillover in trade, but also on other (measurable) factors, including the number of
neighbors currently selling there, the level and heterogeneity of their export sales, and the rms
own prior knowledge about the market. More neighbors may not encourage export entries. The
relationship depends on the strength of the signal (average neighborsexport sales or growth). An
increased prevalence of neighboring export activities will increase the rate of exportersentry into
new markets when the signal is positive, whereas it will deter entry when the signal is negative.
Our model proposes the use of an interaction between the signal and the prevalence of neighboring
export activities, rather than the prevalence measure only, as a more direct variable to empirically
identify information spillover in trade.
Our model yields several predictions. It predicts that a positive signal about foreign market
demand from neighbors induces more export entries and larger initial sales among the entrants
in the same market. This e¤ect is stronger when the signal is more precise, due to more rms
revealing it. Given the positive relationship between the strength of the signal, its precision,
and new exportersinitial sales, new exportersaverage export growth after entry, conditional on
survival, is lower the stronger and more precise the signal is. In other words, a rm is less likely to
be surprised and increase exports signicantly ex post when the ex ante signal about the foreign
market is more precise. The model also shows a weaker response in export entry to a positive signal
when observed neighborsperformance is more dispersed (i.e., a lower signal-to-noise ratio), and a
stronger response when the rm is less informed about the new market ex ante and needs to rely
more on information from neighbors.
Finally, our model shows that conditional on the signal and rm productivity, a new exporters
survival rate in a market is independent of the prevalence of neighbors serving the same market.
However, since the prevalence of neighbors revealing a positive signal is correlated with the mass of
export entrants, it will also a¤ect the fraction of export survivors. Given sunk entry costs and rm
heterogeneity, a more positive or precise signal induces more low-productivity rms to enter. In the
presence of per-period xed export costs, the less productive export entrants are more likely to exit
ex post. The fraction of surviving export entrants will be decreasing in the strength of the signal,
more so if it is revealed by more neighbors. Thus, our model highlights that existing evidence on
the positive information spillover e¤ect on survival can be determined by more low-productivity
entrants on the one hand, and a more accurate neighborsrevealed signal on the other.5
5By using transaction-level data, we address the selection bias in the empirical analysis by focusing on the within-
rm variation in performance across markets by controlling for rm-year xed e¤ects.
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Using transaction-level trade data for the universe of Chinese exporters over 2000-2006, we nd
supporting evidence for the main theoretical predictions. In particular, controlling for rm-year
xed e¤ects (rms supply shocks), city-year xed e¤ects (countries demand shocks), and city-
country xed e¤ects, we nd that the entry rate and initial sales of new exporters in a market are
both positively correlated with the strength of the signal, measured by the average level or growth
rate of neighboring rms exports to the same market.6 The positive correlation is increasing
in the prevalence of neighbors located in the same city.7 The learning e¤ects on new exporters
entry and initial sales are both quantitatively important. Controlling for rm supply shocks and
country demand shocks, the sample mean growth rate of neighborsexports to a country (20%)
is associated with a one-third increase in export entry, evaluated at the median entry rate (0.3%)
of the pooled sample. At the sample mean export growth, a one standard-deviation increase in
the (log) density of neighboring rms (5 more neighbors per squared mile) exporting to a country
is associated with a 10% higher entry rate in the same country, evaluated at the median entry
rate. The corresponding positive e¤ect of the interaction between the signal and the prevalence of
neighbors on new exportersinitial sales is about 0.5%.
Our regressions show that new exporterspost-entry growth, conditional on survival, is neg-
atively correlated with both the strength of the signal and its interaction with the prevalence of
neighbors, as predicted by our model. The survival rate of export entrants, however, does not
appear to be correlated with either the prevalence of neighborsexport activities and the strength
of their revealed signal, contrasting with part of our prediction and most existing ndings in the
literature. All empirical ndings in the paper remain robust to controlling for the number of rms
serving other markets and its interaction with the corresponding signal, including di¤erent sets of
xed e¤ects, and in specications that use alternative measures of the signal and of the prevalence
of neighbors.
To further conrm that it is learning rather than other channels through which positive exter-
nalities are identied from neighbors, we empirically examine the theoretical predictions regarding
the relations between export entry rates, the precision of the signal, and the rms prior knowledge
about the new markets. While our empirical results do not support the specic prediction about
the negative e¤ects of a noisier signal on export entry rates, they reveal stronger learning e¤ects for
rms exporting to new markets that are farther away from China, which Chinese rms are presum-
ably less familiar with; and weaker learning e¤ects for rms entering new markets that share similar
characteristics (e.g., o¢ cial language) with the rmspreviously served markets. Our ndings also
reveal stronger learning e¤ects in situations when neighbors are domestic rather than foreign, con-
sistent with the hypotheses that foreign rms are more attentive in restricting the leakage of trade
secrets, or that there is less information exchange between domestic and foreign exporters. We also
6 In particular, city-country xed e¤ects capture all path-dependent factors that may simultaneously determine
new exporterssales dynamics and neighborsexport performance, avoiding the common reectionproblem often
encountered in the literature on information or technology spillover.
7The prevalence of neighbors is measured by the density, a normalization of the number of rms by the size of the
city, or by the number itself. Results remain robust to the use of either measure.
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nd that rms learn from both neighbors in the same city, as well as those outside the city but
in the same province. Collectively, these ndings conrm that information inferred from neighbors
reduces exporters uncertainty about selling in new foreign markets, which in turn shapes their
sales dynamics and performance there.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature. Section 3 presents
a theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the data source and presents summary statistics of the
data. Section 5 discusses our empirical strategy and presents the main results. The nal section
concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to recent studies on rms
export strategies and dynamics (Eaton, et al., 2008; Albornoz et al., 2011, among others). It shows
that new exporters often start selling small amount and many of them cease exporting after the
rst year.8 The related theoretical research incorporates learning and/ or search in trade models
to rationalize these ndings (Rauch and Watson, 2003; Freund and Pierola, 2010; Iacovone and
Javorcik, 2010; Albornoz et al., 2012; Eaton et al., 2012; Nguyen, 2012; among others).9 Most of
these models focus on rmsown export experiences to look for determinants of export dynamics.10
We focus instead on learning from neighbors.11
Second, our paper applies the inuential social learning models (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Banerjee,
1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Ivo, 1992, 1998) to the study of international trade. Belief
updating based on observed behaviors and/ or outcomes of others is a common feature in these
models. There is a growing empirical literature that uses micro data to test these theories.12
For instance, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) examine the roles of learning by doing and learning
from others in determining farmers adoption of new seeds. Conley and Udry (2010) examine
8Among others, Eaton et al. (2008) nd that over 60% of new exporters in Colombia do not survive into the
next year, but those that do account for a signicant share of the countrys aggregate export volume. Consistently,
Albornoz et al. (2011) nd that about half of new exporters in Argentina export only for one year. By focusing on
agricultural exports from Peru, Freund and Pierola (2010) nd evidence of very large entry and exit in the export
sector and in new destinations, with high exit rates after just one year (above 50% on average), especially among
small starters. Blum et al. (2013) nd that one-third of exporters enter into and exit from exporting multiple times
in a 19-year panel of Chilean rms.
9For example, Albornoz et al. (2012) build a model that predicts rmssequential exporting strategy, which
arises when a rm realizes its export protability through exporting and then decides whether to serve other des-
tinations based on its past export performance. Nguyen (2012) develops a model that features uncertain foreign
demands that are correlated across markets. Firms export performance in a market can inform a rm about its
future performance in other markets.
10A notable exception is Araujo, Mion, and Ornelas (2014), who explain rmsexport dynamics in situations where
exporters learn about the reliability of trade partners in the destination through repeated interactions. The learning
process depends on both the destinations institutions and the producers export experience.
11The one exception that we are aware of is Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008). The authors develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model, which features uncertainty and learning about country-specic xed export costs. By
observing existing exportersprots in foreign markets, potential exporters can obtain an updated prior about the
random xed costs. We focus on learning about foreign demand instead as our data permit the construction of
time-varying demand factors.
12See Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) for an extensive review of other micro evidence of technology adoption.
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the pattern of fertilizer use by Ghanian pineapple farmers and underinvestment in fertilizers due to
unobserved information cost. They nd that information exchange between farmers shape expected
protability, which in turn a¤ects the actual adoption of fertilizers. Built on a normal learning
model, Moretti (2011) derives micro-foundations for the dynamics of movie sales in the U.S. by
relating the learning-driven sales to the ex ante measurable priors about the quality of movies. He
shows both theoretically and empirically that more precise priors about moviesquality is associated
with less learning e¤ects. We will examine a similar hypothesis using micro-level export data.
Building on the social learning models, we contribute to the literature on information spillover
in exports. In particular, we relate surprises, networks, and the relative precision of priors and
signals to rmsexport dynamics. We show how learning a¤ects export performance and dynamics
in a fast growing developing country, where information about foreign sales opportunities is vastly
asymmetric between rms. Our detailed transaction-level data permit an empirical examination of
learning models, without relying on experiments or micro surveys that are often unavailable but
are required for a study of learning.
Third, our paper relates to the early empirical studies on the determinants of exportersentry
and survival. Aitken et al. (1997), Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Chen and
Swenson (2008) and Koenig et al. (2010) are among the early studies on how the prevalence of
existing exporters or multinational rms induces new export linkages. More recent research has
used transactions-level data (Alvarez et al., 2008; Cadot et al., 2011).13 Adding to the literature,
our work is distinct in several respects. First, we examine the e¤ects not only on entry but on
four di¤erent measures of export performance: entry, survival, initial sales, and export growth
conditional on survival. Second, not only do we examine the relationship between the prevalence
of existing market-specic export activities and new exportersperformance, we also examine the
correlation between them, conditional on the strength of the signal. To the extent that learning
is the main channel, the prevalence of existing exporters should matter di¤erently for positive and
negative signals. Third, our model shows that in the presence of rm heterogeneity and xed costs,
rm entry and survival are related, which requires controlling for rm or rm-year xed e¤ects
in regression analyses. Fourth, we use city boundary to dene geographic units, which are much
ner than what has been commonly used in existing research on information spillover. Finally, we
explore information spillover across destinations within rms, controlling for all rm-specic and
market-specic shocks.
By analyzing the impact of the geographical agglomeration of exporters on rmsexport per-
formance, our paper is also related to the new economic geography literature represented by the
landmark papers of Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), and Duranton and Puga
(2004).14 Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on the role of xed and sunk costs of
13Alvarez et al. (2008) nd rm-level evidence from Chile that the probability of exporting in a new market (product
or destination) increases with the prevalence of other exporters in the same market. Cadot et al. (2011) nd evidence
for four Sub-Saharan African countries that the probability of export survival increases with the presence of other
rmsexporting the same product to the same country.
14Greenaway and Kneller (2008) nd that regional and sectoral agglomeration has a positive e¤ect on new rm
entry into export markets. Spillover from neighboring exporters, as the current paper studies, can a¤ect a rms
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exporting in shaping trade patterns and dynamics (see Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; Bernard
et al., 2007; Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007; Chaney, 2008).
3 Model
We develop a simple model to guide our empirical analysis on exportersdynamics. The model
features normal learning, similar to a variety of models by Jovanovic (1982), Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995), Conley and Udry (2010), and Moretti (2011). We focus on learning about demand rather
than production, as in Moretti (2011).15 Our model is static in nature. Specically, we focus on
a simple two-period structure when analyzing new exportersentry and post-entry performance.
Time subscripts will only be introduced when necessary.
3.1 Set-up
Before exporting to a country, a rm holds a prior belief about the demand of that country.
After observing its neighborsexport performance in the same country, a rm updates both the
expectation about the countrys demand and the precision of its expectation. The model features
heterogeneous rm productivity, monopolistic competitive goods markets, and constant-elasticity-
of-substitution preferences, as in Melitz (2003). Each rm faces its own downward-sloping demand.
Before entering a new market, a rm draws productivity  from a cumulative distribution function
G ().
Specically, consider rm i with productivity  selling to market m.16 Its gross (operating)
prot will be o (Dim; ) = Dim 1, where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
available in all markets. While each rm knows its own productivity before entry, it is uncertain
about its export prot due to random rm-market-specic demand. In particular, rm is (log)
demand shifter, ln (Dim), can be decomposed into three components as follows:
ln (Dim) = + dm + zim;
where  is a constant.17 dm = ln (P mYm) is the market-specic component that is common for all
export performance through similar mechanisms, by lowering the cost of obtaining information on export markets.
See Ottaviano and Puga (2004) for a survey of the New Economic Geography literature.
15We abstract from learning about production for simplicity, but by no means we think it is unimportant for
export. The reason why only a small fraction of rms exports is because (a) they are uncertain about the foreign
market demand or (b) they know that they do not have su¢ ciently high productivity to make prots by selling
abroad. Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) and Freund and Pierola (2010) have developed alternative models to
analyze uncertainty in trade costs. They also abstract away from learning about production technology. As reviewed
above, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley and Udry (2010) focus on learning from neighbors about production
technology.
16A market is dened as a country to be consistent with our empirical analysis below. Since learning can be
market-product-specic, we will repeat our baseline empirical analysis focusing on specic industries.
17With monopolistic competition and constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility, Dim =
 
1

   1
w
 1
ZimP

mYm,
where Pm is the ideal price index of market m; Ym is the total expenditure in market m; w is the factor input cost
(e.g., the wage rate if labor is the only factor input).  equals ln
h 
1

   1
w
 1i
.
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rms, where Pm and Ym are the ideal price index and total expenditure in market m, respectively.
zim = ln (Zim) is rm is market-specic product appeal in marketm, which cannot be inferred from
neighborsperformance but is realized right after the rms rst year of exporting. For simplicity,
we assume that all three components of ln (Dim) are time-invariant.18 If ln (Dim) is time-varying
(e.g., the market-specic factor contains a time subscript, dmt), as long as it is autocorrelated
across time with a permanent component, rms will still learn from neighbors about future export
protability.19
Before selling in market m, a rm faces uncertainty about both dm and zim; but after selling
there, rm i learns about both dm and zim with certainty and there is nothing more to learn.20
Without any experience in serving market m, rm i does not know dm and holds a prior belief that
dm is distributed normally with mean dm and variance vdm:
dm  N
 
dm; vdm

:
The assumption that dm is time-invariant implies that once it is learned upon entry, there is no
more uncertainty about dm. Suppose dm is time-varying and is positively correlated across time,
all the theoretical results will still hold with mild assumptions.21
Two rms with the same productivity can have di¤erent realized export prots in market m
due to di¤erent product appeals, zim, which is assumed to be ex ante unknown to the rm itself
and normally distributed with mean zero and variance vzm:
zim  N (0; vzm) :
Both vdm and vzm can vary across m. A higher vdm can be interpreted as the rm having
less prior knowledge about market m. A higher vzm can be a result of more heterogeneous export
performance observed from neighbors, who export to market m (more below). We assume that
rm productivity  and product appeal zim are independently distributed, similar to Bernard et
al. (2010).
Without any information about market m from its own export experience or those of others,
18The model can be extended along the lines of Timoshenko (2013), who explores learning from ones own experi-
ence. To our understanding, keeping the stock of information in a dynamic setting is challenging and has not been
done in the literature. We will leave it for future research.
19 In our empirical specications below, we e¤ectively control for these time-varying components by including rm-
year, market-year, and city-year xed e¤ects.
20These assumptions are consistent with the ndings of Eaton el al. (2008), who show that in Colombia, rms that
survive the rst year of exporting have an average survival rate of 90% in the second and subsequent years.
21 In a dynamic setting, dm can be allowed to vary over time and to be positively correlated across time with a
permanent component. More formally, the autocorrelation of dm;t should be described by the following equation:
dmt   dm;t 1 = 
 
dm;t 1   dm;t 2

+ mt;
where  > 0 and mt is the permanent shock. See Section 4 for an exposition of the high persistence of demand
shocks.
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rm i expects to obtain an operating prot from exports to m as follows:
E [o (Dim; )] = 
 1E [Dim]
=  1
h
exp

dm +
vm
2
i
;
where  = exp (), a constant, and vm = vdm + vzm. Notice that the rms expected revenue
depends not only on the mean value of Dm, but also on its variance, vm. To the extent that a
market is perceived as more uncertain, the higher level of uncertainty should deter entry. But since
the log-normal distribution is not mean preserving, a larger dispersion in Dim actually encourages
more rms to experiment because of a higher upside for export sales. As will be shown below, all
theoretical results are independent from this counter-intuitive result.22
Each rm has to pay a sunk cost, Kem, to enter market m. Firms that expect an export revenue
lower than Kem will not enter. The ex ante zero-prot condition (i.e., E [
o (Dmt; )] = K
e
m) pins
down the productivity of the least productive exporter serving market m as follows:
e  dm; vm   1 = Kem
 exp
 
dm +
vm
2
 : (1)
Conditional on exporting, the rm chooses quantity of export, which equals the expected export
sales divided by its price, E [R (Dim; )] =p (), where E [R (Dim; )] = E [o (Dm; )] and p () =

 1
c
 , a constant mark-up over marginal cost, c=: After the rst period of exporting, the rm
realizes Dim and there is no more to learn either from its own experience or neighbors.
3.2 Learning from Neighbors
Suppose rm i is surrounded by nm;t 1 neighbors, who entered at period t 1 or before and export
to market m at period t   1. Two assumptions are needed for solving the model in closed form.
First, we assume that the rm observes the average neighborsexport revenue to market m at t 1,
Rm;t 1.23 Second, we assume that the rm knows the time-varying conditional mean of neighbors
productivity, bt 1 = E j 1 > et 1, where et 1 is the productivity threshold for export entry
at t   1, taking the form of eq. (1). In other words, similar to Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012),
we implicitly assume that new exporters have limited memory and cannot recall the productivity
thresholds, et k, for the cohort of neighbors that enter in year t   k for all k 2 [2;1).24 If rm
22However, this is a partial-equilibrium result. If we fully develop a general-equilibrium model, the expected
discounted value of the future stream of prots could be decreasing in vm, potentially o¤setting the positive e¤ect of
a higher variance of the distribution of vm on the entry rate.
23A more restrictive assumption is that it observes each neighbors export value, which is not required here. We
are aware that the reality can be quite di¤erent from this simplifying assumption. For instance, rms only observe
some of the rms, especially the large ones. Depending on their networks, di¤erent rms will have di¤erent sets of
observed neighbors. While partial observability could potentially be incorporated in the model, we prefer to keep the
model simple and instead explore di¤erential learning e¤ects in the empirical section below.
24Notice that et k can uctuate across time depending on the underlying process of the destinations true state of
demand. Without a dynamic model, we cannot say much about the cohorts of entrants and will need to rely on the
memorylessassumption.
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i is an export pioneer in market m (i.e., there is no existing rm selling there), it holds a belief
that et 1 = e  dm; vm as in eq. (1). If it has neighbors that entered at t   1, it holds a belief
that et 1 = edpostm;t 1; vm;t 1, where the posterior mean for period t  1, dpostm;t 1, and the posterior
variance, vm;t 1, will be discussed below. Based on et 1, the knowledge about the distribution of
, the number of neighbors, nmt, and their average export revenue observed, Rm;t 1, the rm infers
the demand level of market m as d
nb
mt =
(Rm;t 1=nm;t 1)b 1t 1 .25
Based on d
nb
m;t 1 inferred from nm;t 1 neighbors, the rm updates its prior, in the way proposed
by Degroot (2004).26 The posterior is normally distributed with the following mean:27
d
post
mt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

= E
h
dmtjnm;t 1; dnbm;t 1
i
= td
nb
m;t 1 + (1  t) dm; (2)
where t is the weight the rm puts on d
nb
m;t 1 when updating its belief. According to Degroot
(2004), t can be derived as
t (nm;t 1; vdm; vzm) =
nm;t 1vdm
vzm + nmtvdm
=

1 +
1
nm;t 1
vzm
vdm
 1
: (3)
The conditional variance of dmt, given nm;t 1 and d
nb
m;t 1, can be expressed as
vmt (nm;t 1; vdm; vzm) =
vzmvdm
vzm + nm;t 1vdm
=

1
vdm
+
nm;t 1
vzm
 1
: (4)
Notice that d
nb
m;t 1 depends on the true state of demand (dm) in market m:
d
nb
mt (d

m) = d

m +
1
nm;t 1
nm;t 1X
j=1
zim: (5)
Partial di¤erentiation yields the following comparative statics regarding the relationship be-
tween the number of neighbors, the precision of the prior, and the precision of the signal:
@t
@nm;t 1
> 0;
@t
@ (vzm=vdm)
< 0: (6)
In words, when updating the prior, a potential entrant will put a larger weight (t) on its
neighborssignals about demand in market m and a smaller weight on its own prior belief, if there
are more neighbors revealing the signal. On the other hand, when the signal from neighbors is less
precise (higher vzm) due to more heterogeneous product appeals, all else being equal, the rm will
25One can argue that in addition to observing its neighborsexport value, a rm can also potentially learn about
its neighborsdecisions to continue exporting or not. We assume that a rm only observes its neighborspast export
performance and does not communicate with its neighbors about their future plans. To the extent that most neighbors
are competitors, this assumption is reasonable.
26We can relax the assumption a bit by assuming that the rm does not necessarily observe each individual rms
export performance in country m, but knows their average export sales in each market.
27See Chapter 9 of DeGroot (2004).
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put a smaller weight on the signal. Similarly, the rm will put a larger weight on the signal if it is
less informed about market m ex ante, captured by a higher vdm.
On the other hand, the posterior variance of the signal, vmt, depends on nm;t 1, vdm, and vzm
as follows:
@vmt
@nm;t 1
< 0;
@vmt
@vdm
> 0;
@vmt
@vzm
> 0:
The precision of the posterior, v 1mt , increases with the number of neighbors revealing the signal.
In the extreme case when the number of neighbors approaches innity, the rm observes the true
demand in market m, dm, according to (5) as the variance of the signal approaches 0. The rm will
then ignore its own prior and rely solely on its neighborsrevealed signal. The last two inequalities
are intuitive.
3.2.1 Entry into New Export Markets
We rst analyze how learning from neighbors a¤ects exportersentry decision. A rms decision
to enter market m depends not only on how many neighbors are already exporting to m, but
also on whether the demand level inferred from the average neighborsexport revenue exceeds the
rms prior.28 By building a static model, we restrict ourselves from analyzing the potentially
interesting strategic interactions among rms.29 That is, we do not analyze how a rm may take
into account the impact of its entry on other rmsentry decisions and thus its own revenue in the
future. In reality, rms have strong incentives to hide information from potential competitors. One
strategy is to delay entry so as to avoid information spillover to other potential entrants. Another
benet of delaying entry is to obtain information from more existing exporters in the future. While
incorporating strategic interactions and the option value of waiting into the model will deliver new
insights, it will complicate the model substantially. In section 3.2.5 below, we will discuss in greater
detail how such extensions will a¤ect the robustness of our theoretical results.
A rm will start exporting after receiving a signal that lowers the entry threshold. Similar to
(1), the posterior entry productivity threshold is
et dpostmt ; vmt   1t = Kem
 exp

d
post
mt +
vmt
2
 ; (7)
where d
post
mt and vmt are dened in (2) and (4) above, respectively.
Consider a neighborhood with nm;t 1 rms exporting to market m. A positive shock to market
ms demand at t   1 causes dnbm;t 1 > dnbmt 2. The entry threshold at t will be lower than that at
t  1, i.e., epostt < epostt 1 . Specically, rms with  1 that is lower than epostt 1 but higher than epostt
28To keep the model tractable, we sidestep from explaining why some rms start exporting before others. A natural
extension of the model is to consider rmsheterogeneous private signals.
29Notice that the dynamic model on learning and export entry by Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) also
abstracts from strategic interactions between rms. It does, however, solve for the option value of waiting. Despite
this obvious strength, learning is modelled in a rather reduced-form fashion in their paper. Our model builds on a
class of well-known normal learning models, which pay closer attention to the micro-foundation of learning.
11
will start exporting to market m at t. To formally study the learning e¤ects on entry, let us denote
the semi-elasticity of epostt with respect to dnbm;t 1 by "t  @ lnepostt
@d
nb
m;t 1
, which can be solved as
"t =  t (nm;t 1) =  

1 +
vzm
vdmnm;t 1
 1
< 0: (8)
That is, in the presence of neighbors serving market m, an increase in the signal will lower the
entry threshold epostt , thus increasing entry. The e¤ect of nm;t 1 on j"tj will depend on the number
of exporters, the dispersion (the inverse of the precision) of the prior, vdm, and the dispersion of
the neighborssignals, vzm. Notice that while an increase in the prevalence of neighbors can a¤ect
the variance of the posterior, it only a¤ects the updating process through changing the weights a
rm puts on the observed signal and on its own prior. More formally:30
@ j"tj
@nm;t 1
=
vzm
vdm

nm;t 1 +
vzm
vdm
 2
> 0: (9)
In other words, more neighbors will result in a larger drop in the threshold, epostt , in response to
a positive signal. The rationale is that when there are more rms revealing the signal, it becomes
more precise, inducing a potential entrant to put a higher weight on the signal than on its own
prior belief. This is the main theoretical result of the paper and is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 (Entry I) The likelihood of a rms entering a new foreign market is increasing
in the strength of the signal about the markets demand inferred from neighborsexport performance,
and more so if the signal is revealed by more neighbors.
Notice that the sign of the relationship between the prevalence of existing exporters and the
export entry threshold, @epostt@nm;t 1 , is generally indeterminate. The reason is that more neighbors can
help spread both good and bad news, which will lead to opposite e¤ects on rm entry.
We now analyze the e¤ect of the precision of the signal and the precision of the prior, respec-
tively, on the elasticity of the entry threshold with respect to the signal, j"tj. Di¤erentiating j"tj
with respect to the signal yields:
@ j"tj
@vzm
=   (vdmnm;t 1) 1

1 +
vzm
vdmnm;t 1
 2
< 0
@ j"tj
@vdm
= vzm
 
v2dmnm;t 1
 1
1 +
vzm
vdmnm;t 1
 2
> 0: (10)
These results are intuitive. On the one hand, a noisier signal (higher vzm) is associated with a
30Moreover, learning from neighbors exhibits decreasing returns.
@j"tj
@nm;t 1 =
1 +
vdmnm;t 1
vzm
 1
  1

2vzm
vdmn
3
m;t 1

1 + vzm
vdmnm;t 1
 2
< 0.
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smaller entry response, conditional on the level of the (average) signal. On the other hand, a less
precise prior (higher vdm) is associated with a larger response to a given average signal, as the rm
will put a larger weight on the signal and a smaller weight on its own prior. The relationships
above are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Entry II) The likelihood of a rms entering a new foreign market is lower if
its neighborsexport performances in the same market are more dispersed, all else being equal. On
the other hand, it is higher if the rm itself has less prior knowledge about the market.
We will empirically examine both propositions in Section 5 below.
3.2.2 EntrantsInitial Sales
Our model also has predictions about exporters initial sales in a new market. Recent literature
shows that new exporters often start selling small quantities in new markets (Eaton et al., 2008;
Albornoz et al., 2011). The standard explanation is that uncertainty about exporting induces rms
to start small to test a new market (Rauch and Watson, 2003; Eaton et al., 2012), which may
require a smaller ex-ante investment. In this section, we explore if the size of initial sales is related
to the strength and the precision of the signals from neighboring exporters. The rst-year sales of
a new exporter with productivity  can be expressed as:
xt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

=  1E
h
Dimjnm;t 1; dnbm;t 1
i
=  1 exp

d
post
mt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

+
vmt (nm;t 1)
2

In addition to the known productivity, , xt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

also depends on the (posterior)
expected demand factor in market m and on the variance of the signal. Intuitively, a higher d
nb
m;t 1
increases new exportersinitial sales in market m as shown by
@ ln

xt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

@d
nb
m;t 1
= t (nm;t 1) =

1 +
1
nm;t 1
vzm
vdm
 1
> 0:
The e¤ect of the number of neighbors on the size of initial exports is ambiguous. This is because
on the one hand, more neighbors will increase the e¤ect of a positive signal on initial sales (i.e.,
@d
post
mt
@nm;t 1 > 0). On the other hand, an increase in the number of neighbors will increase the precision
of the signal (i.e., @vmt(nm;t 1)@nm;t 1 < 0) and lower the spread of the (posterior) expected operating
prots. The net e¤ect on initial sales will depend on the relative strength of each of the two e¤ects.
However, if we focus on the interactive e¤ect between the signal, d
nb
m;t 1, and the prevalence of
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neighbors, nm;t 1, we are able to pin down a more deterministic spillover e¤ect as follows:
@
@nm;t 1
 
@ ln (xt)
@d
nb
m;t 1
!
=
vzm
vdm

nm;t 1 +
vzm
vdm
 2
> 0:
In other words, there is a positive interactive e¤ect on exportersinitial sales in a new market,
based on the same reasons behind the interactive e¤ect on entry. The result regarding new exporters
initial sales is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 (Initial Sales) An exporters initial sales in a new market is increasing in the
strength of the signal about the markets demand inferred from neighborsexport performance, and
more so if the signal is revealed by more neighbors.
3.2.3 Survival
Our learning model also has predictions about the survival of exporters in a new market. Consider
a rm with productivity , the probability of its survival in market m at t+ 1, after the rst year
of exporting at t, will depend on its draw of product appeal, zim. If the actual operating prot
o (Dim; ) is higher than the per-period xed cost to export, the rm will continue into the second
year (t+ 1). Specically, the probability of survival is
St+1 (; d

m) = Pr

 1 exp (dm + zim)  Km

= 1  

1p
vzm

ln

Km
 1

  dm

;
where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and Km is the per-period xed
cost, which can be di¤erent from Kem. A lower Km, a higher rm productivity (), and a higher true
demand factor in the destination country (dm), all have independently positive e¤ects on export
survival. Specically,
@St+1 (; d

m)
@dm
=
1p
vzm


1p
vzm

ln

Km
 1

  dm

> 0;
where  is the probability distribution function of zim. Notice that St+1 (; d

m) depends on the
true state of demand rather than the observed average demand factor of neighbors, d
nb
mt. But since
dm is unobservable we will use d
nb
mt to proxy for it in the empirical section below, based on eq. (5).
While the number of neighbors, nm;t 1, a¤ects the number of entrants by changing the entry
threshold  1
t
as discussed above, nm;t 1 should have no e¤ect on an exporters decision to continue
exporting. Hence, an exporters survival rate is not related to nm;t 1. However, since d
nb
m;t 1 and
nm;t 1 a¤ect the probability of entry, the sample of entrants and thus the average survival rate (the
fraction of new exporters that survive) will also be a¤ected. Specically, given sunk entry costs,
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a more positive or precise signal induces more low-productivity rms to enter. In the presence of
per-period xed export costs, the less productive export entrants are more likely to exit ex post.
The fraction of surviving export entrants will be decreasing in the strength of the signal, more so
if it is revealed by more neighbors. In the empirical section below, we account for this selection
bias. If productivity is rm-specic and product appeal is ex ante unknown, our model shows that
focusing on the within-rm variation in survival by controlling for rm-year xed e¤ects can fully
address the selection issue.31 Controlling for rm-year xed e¤ects, we expect a positive impact of
the strength of the signal on survival, but no relationship with the prevalence of neighbors or its
interaction with the signal.32 The learning e¤ects on new exporterssurvival are summarized as
follows:
Proposition 4 (Survival) Exporterssurvival probability in a new market is positively correlated
with the strength of the signal about the markets demand, but is independent of the prevalence of
neighborsexport activities.
3.2.4 Growth Conditional on Survival
Finally, for a rm with productivity  that continues to export in market m after realizing zim, we
can derive its export growth rate, conditional on survival, as follows:
E
h
gimt () jnm;t 1; dnbm;t 1
i
= ln

 1
Z 1
 1
exp (dm + zim) d (zim)

  ln

xt

nm;t 1; d
nb
m;t 1

:
By the law of large numbers, the rst term on the right hand side is constant for market m in
year t. Given @@nm;t 1

@ ln(xt)
@d
nb
m;t 1

> 0 as shown by Proposition 3, the interactive e¤ect on post-entry
growth is
@
@nm;t 1
 
@E [gimt ()]
@d
nb
m;t 1
!
< 0.
In words, in the presence of learning from neighbors, there is less potential for the new exporter
to be surprised after entry. When neighbors signals become stronger and more precise, a new
exporter was more informed ex ante and is less likely to form a posterior that is very di¤erent from
its prior. For the same reason, new exporters will also be less likely to have downside surprises.
However, since new exporters that have realized zim signicantly lower than expectations are no
31An alternative way to address this issue is to implement the Heckmans selection procedure. However, with
millions of observations, such an approach proves computationally impractical.
32As the average productivity of new exporters is decreasing in the number of exporters, a negative correlation
between the number of exporters and the rmssurvival rate could be incorrectly identied, if rm xed e¤ects are
not controlled for. While our model predicts no spillover e¤ect from neighbors to new exporterssurvival, it points
to the need of controlling for rm xed e¤ects when examining the spillover e¤ects on survival.
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longer in the sample, the incidence of reduced downside surprises is not observed in the sample of
survivors. We therefore focus on the negative e¤ect on upside surprises and empirically investigate
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Post-entry Growth) The post-entry growth rate rmsexports to a new mar-
ket, conditional on survival, is decreasing in the level of the ex ante signal about the markets
demand, and more so if the signal is revealed by more neighbors.
One may be worried about potential biases when exits are not taken into account. Notice
that according to Proposition 4, the survival rate of new exporters is independent of nm;t 1. The
direction of the bias due to selection is unclear but once we control for rm xed e¤ects in the
empirical analysis below, our results are independent of the standard problem of selection across
rms.
3.2.5 Discussion
Several remarks are in order regarding the robustness of our results to potentially incorporating
two dynamic considerations in the model, namely the option value of waiting and rmsstrategic
interactions. Intuitively, with the implicit assumption that the underlying true state of demand,
dmt, is positively correlated across time, there are benets associated with waiting for a more precise
signal in the future. Waiting will raise the productivity threshold of entry in the current period.
When the number of rms selling in a market increases, both the competitive pressure and the
precision of the signal will increase. In a dynamic model, rms will consider these intertemporal
trade-o¤s, but without solving a dynamic model, we can logically postulate that the more productive
rms, who have higher forgone expected prots in the rst period and relatively smaller expected
losses in the future, will enter rst. Building a dynamic model would permit a more formal analysis
of rmssequence of entry, this however is beyond the scope of our empirical analysis.
The second dynamic consideration is about rmsstrategic interactions. In a world with monop-
olistic competition, each rm is assumed to be too small to a¤ect aggregate variables in equilibrium.
However, this standard assumption may not hold in terms of information spillover, as even some
information revealed by a small number of rms is way better than having no information. To
avoid competition, rms may intentionally delay entry to reduce information spillover to others,
even upon receiving a positive signal. Similar to the remarks on optimal waiting, information hiding
will also raise the productivity threshold of entry for all periods. We can again postulate that entry
decisions of the more productive (large) rmswill be less a¤ected by this consideration, as their
opportunity costs of not entering in the current period are higher than those of the less productive
ones. In sum, the main predictions of the model that rms positively respond to a more positive
and precise signal (Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5) should remain robust to the incorporation of both
types of dynamic considerations. The learning e¤ects may be weakened quantitatively, which work
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against us in the empirical analysis below.
However, our predictions about the dispersion of the signals and entry (Proposition 2) may be
sensitive to the incorporation of dynamic considerations in the model. Productive rms, who have
higher opportunity costs of staying put and lower expected losses in the future, may react positively
to a noisier signal. The heterogeneous responses to the precision of the signal across rms may
o¤set each other, working against us empirically. We will include di¤erent xed e¤ects to control
for many unobserved determinants of new exportersdynamics in the empirical analysis below.33
4 Data
4.1 Description
The main data set used in the empirical analysis covers monthly export and import transactions of
all Chinese rms between 2000 and 2006.34 For each transaction, the data set contains information
about its value (in US dollars) and quantity, what product it is for (over 7000 HS 8-digit categories),
and to/from which country (over 200 destination and source countries).35 In addition, we also have
information on the ownership type (domestic private, foreign, and state-owned) and trade regime
(processing versus non-processing) of each trading rm, as well as the region or city in China
where the rm trades. To average out noises due to infrequent trade patterns that may vary across
countries or products, we aggregate all observations to the year level. We focus on learning about
a foreign countrys demand and collapse the product dimension. Thus, a market is dened as a
destination country in the empirical analysis.36 In our empirical analysis, we always exclude exports
to Hong Kong from the sample because many rms have their headquarters in Hong Kong, who
serve as intermediaries to re-export nal products to foreign markets.
Exporters in China are required by law to register as either processing exporters or non-
processing (ordinary) exporters.37 The majority of processing exporters have long-time committed
foreign buyers (e.g. the largest processing exporter in China, Foxconn, has a long-time committed
buyer, Apple). One can argue that for this type of exporters, there is little to learn about both
foreign demand and product design, as the related information is often provided directly by the
foreign buyer. Without a perfect way to isolate information provided by foreign buyers, we focus
on the sample of non-processing rms as learners, presuming that the learning e¤ects for ordinary
exporters are larger and more relevant than those for processing exporters.
33For instance, we include rm-year xed e¤ects in the regressions below to control for rm-level time-varying pro-
ductivity, which can isolate the e¤ects of heterogeneous strategic waiting by rms with di¤erent levels of productivity.
34The same data set has been used by Manova and Zhang (2010) and Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei (2010).
35Example of a product: 611241 - Womens or girlsswimwear of synthetic bres, knitted or crocheted.
36This decision is made mainly due to the limit of computing power. We check robustness of the results by repeating
the main regressions for major exporting sectors. See section 5.5.
37A registered processing rm is required by law to maintain higher standards for accounting practices and ware-
house facilities. Moreover, the terms of transactions for processing rms are to be specied in greater detail in written
contracts than ordinary exporters. An exporter can hold several export licenses and operate part of its business under
the processing regime and another part under the ordinary regime. Readers are referred to Naughton (1996), Feenstra
and Hanson (2005) and Fernandes and Tang (2012) for more details about the two trading regimes.
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We rely on the cross-city variation in the prevalence of neighbors to identify the learning ef-
fects. Fig. 4 illustrates the geographic distribution of the cities. There are on average 425 cities
plus municipalities, according to Chinas Customsdenition.38 We also explore the potentially
di¤erential learning e¤ects across destination countries. To this end, we use data on bilateral dis-
tance, common language, and common border, between China and the destination and between a
rms existing markets and new markets. Data are from CEPII.39 See Mayer and Zignago (2006)
for details. Summary statistics of and the correlations between the main variables used in the
empirical analysis are reported in Tables A2-A3 in the online appendix.
4.2 Basic Patterns
Our empirical analysis relies largely on rmsactive entry and exit in each market (destination
countries). Table 1 provides summary statistics of the country scopes of non-processing (ordinary)
exporters, the focus of this paper. The average number of countries served by an exporter is between
5 and 6, while the median is between 2 and 3. The large number of multi-country exporters permits
a study of within-rm variation in export performance, when rm-year xed e¤ects are controlled
for. The relatively small exportersmedian sales indicate that there are many small rms in our
data, which should exhibit active entry and exit according to existing evidence for other countries.
These summary statistics of rms hide considerable entry and exit, as well as active destination
switching for each rm over time. Recent literature reports that a large fraction of new exporters
stops exporting in their rst year.40 Fig. 1 shows that in China, the rate of export survival beyond
the rst year is relatively high and is averaged at around 75% over 2000-2006. Among new export
transactions to a country, the survival rate is about 45%. Table A1 in the online appendix, reports
the patterns of successful entries and one-time exporting across countries between 2001-2005.
5 Empirical Evidence
This section presents the empirical examination of the ve propositions of the paper using Chinese
transaction-level data.
38The number of cities in our sample increases from 408 in 2000 to 425 in 2006. The Chinese government gradually
added new cities.
39http://www.cepii.fr/distance/dist_cepii.dta.
40See Besedes and Prusa (2006) for the US; Eaton et al. (2008) for Colombia; Amador and Opromolla (2008) for
Portugal; Albornoz et al. (2011) for Argentina; and Cadot et al. (2011) for select African countries.
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5.1 Entry
5.1.1 Baseline Results
To examine Propositions 1 and 2 about rmsentry into new foreign markets, we rst dene the
dependent variable of the regression as follows:
Entryicmt =
(
1 if xicm;t 1 = 0, xicmt > 0
0 if xicm;t 1 = 0, xicmt = 0
: (11)
That is, Entryicmt = 1 if rm i in city c was not exporting to country m before year t in the
sample, but started exporting to m in t. The sample includes both brand-new exporters and
existing exporters that enter at least one new market in year t. To study the probability of entry,
we set rm is Entryicmt = 0 for all potential destination countries that were not served by rm i
before year t (inclusive).41 Note that exporters that were already serving country m in year t  1
are not included in the sample.42 Moreover, since we need information from the previous years
export status to dene export entry, all observations from the rst year (i.e., 2000) of the sample
are dropped. All observations from the last year (2006) are also dropped since information from
that year is required to construct the export survival dummy and the measure of post-entry growth
of entrants.
The main empirical challenge is to nd a convincing measure of the signal inferred from neigh-
bors, that is, the demand factor d
nb
cm;t 1 in the model. In practice, d
nb
cm;t 1 is not observed by new
exporters nor by statisticians. To isolate time-invariant neighborsheterogeneous productivity from
the proxy (rms in the model are assumed to do exactly that), we use the average growth rate of
existing rmsexports to country m from city c between year t  1 and t as the baseline proxy for
d
nb
cm;t 1. Specically, neighborsaverage export growth, 4 ln (xcmt) is dened as
4 ln (xcmt) = 1
ncm;t 1
X
i2Ncm;t 1
[ln (xicmt)  ln (xicm;t 1)] ;
where Ncm;t 1 is the set of existing rms that export to m in city c in both year t   1 and t,
and ncm;t 1 is the number of exporters in the set. In other words, new entrants in year t and
one-time exporters from year t  1 are not included in Ncm;t 1. To ensure that we are extracting
the signalcomponent from neighborsexport growth (or average exporterssales in market m),
we will control for a wide range of xed e¤ects to absorb the country-specic and city-specic levels
and trends of exports in the regressions below. We will perform a battery of robustness checks by
using alternative proxies for the signal, which include neighborsaverage export growth lagged by
one year (i.e., 4 ln (xcm;t 1)), the (log) average level of neighborsexports, ln (xcmt), and its lag.
41Since the focus of our analysis is on learning, for each rm that started exporting to a new country, we dene its
set of potential new destinations as the countries that have been served by at least one neighbor in the same city in
t  1. Countries that have not been served by any neighbors are not included in the set.
42They are, however, included in the group of the information providers, as they are existing exporters in the
neighborhood.
19
To verify that 4 ln (xcmt) is a convincing choice of proxy for the signal, we plot the (log)
export volume to country m from city c in year t against the corresponding value in year t   1,
after partialling out city-destination xed e¤ects. Fig. 3 shows that the two values are positively
correlated, suggesting that export sales at the destination and city-destination levels are positively
correlated over time. Therefore, exports in a market today reveal information about the average
export protability of selling in the same market in the future; learning is thus protable since
deviations from city-destination (e.g., Beijing-US) averages tend to last.43
Proposition 1 predicts that the probability of a rm entering a new market is positively cor-
related with the level of the signal about the market, and more so if there are more neighboring
exporters currently selling there. We examine this proposition by estimating a probit model of
entry decisions, with both the stand-alone signal and its interaction with the prevalence of same-
market neighboring exporters as the regressors of interest. Specically, we estimate the following
specication:
Pr [Entryicmt] = +  [ln(ncm;t 1)4 ln (xcmt)] +  4 ln (xcmt) +  ln(ncm;t 1) (12)
+Z 0 + fFEg+ icmt;
where Entryicmt is dened in eq. (11). The regressors of interest include the proxy for the signal
4 ln (xcmt), the (log) number of neighbors in city c continuously exporting to marketm in both t 1
and t, ln(ncm;t 1), and the interaction between the two. Figs. 4-5 show the geographic distribution
of these variables of interest. The values of these variables are widespread across Chinese cities,
and high values are not all concentrated near the coast.
Since cities vary in size and bigger cities have more rms, we need to take into account geographic
frictions that a¤ect the probability of meeting a neighbor and thus learning. To this end, we use
the density of neighbors, which equals the number of neighbors divided by the area of the city,
as our baseline measure of ncm;t 1. All our empirical ndings remain robust to the use of the
raw number of neighbors as the prevalence measure. Z is a vector of rm controls, including the
density of neighbors exporting to other countries, their average export growth, and the interaction
between the two. If information about other destinations also a¤ects export dynamics in country
m, including Z ensures that the identied learning e¤ect, if any, is market-specic.
By exploiting information at the sub-rm level across years, we can include an exhaustive set of
xed e¤ects (fFEg) to control for many unobserved determinants of new exportersexport dynam-
ics. In particular, in all the regression specications, we always include city-country xed e¤ects,
which control for the bilateral distance between a city and a country, as well as physical distance
and any unobserved city-market-specic determinants of export performance and dynamics, such
as historical factors that may a¤ect the available information and infrastructure for exports from a
43When we aggregate neighbors export volume from the city-country levels to the country levels, we continue to nd
a positive correlation between the current and lagged export volume to country m, after partialling out destination
xed e¤ects.
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city to a country.44 In addition to city-country xed e¤ects, we control for city-year, country-year,
or rm-year xed e¤ects, respectively. Country-year xed e¤ects control for any aggregate shocks
that may a¤ect the general attractiveness of a market, such as time-varying demand, exchange
rates, and economic policies in the importing countries.45 City-year xed e¤ects control for any
supply shocks, such as government policies, that a¤ect all exporters in a city. Firm-year xed e¤ects
further control for rm supply shocks. Importantly, by focusing on the within-rm cross-country
correlation between new exportersperformance and the prevalence of neighborsexport activities,
we address the potential sample selection bias that arises from the endogenous entry decisions that
vary across heterogeneous rms.
We estimate eq. (12) using a linear probability model, similar to Bernard and Jensen (2004)
and Albornoz et al. (2011).46 Since our regressors of interest are at a higher level of aggregation
(cmt) than our dependent variables (icmt), we cluster standard errors at the city-country (cm)
level (Moulton, 1990). Table 3 reports the estimates of (12). All columns include city-country
xed e¤ects. In addition, columns 1 and 2 include country-year xed e¤ects, and columns 3 and
4 city-year xed e¤ects. Coe¢ cients on the regressors of interest - the signal from neighboring
exporters serving market m from city c, and its interaction with the density of neighbors are all
positive and statistically signicant (at the 1% level). These results show that the probability of
entering market m is increasing in the average performance of neighboring exporters in the same
market, more so if there are more neighbors revealing the signal. If it is updating of the prior that
triggers rms to start exporting, we should expect weaker or no e¤ect from neighbors serving other
markets. While in column 2, the coe¢ cients on the signal about other markets, 4 ln  xc( m)t,
and its interaction with the (log) density of rms exporting to those markets, ln(nc( m);t 1), are
both positive and signicant, they become insignicant when city-year xed e¤ects are included in
column 4, suggesting that the positive coe¢ cients on the other-marketvariables possibly capture
other city-wide, time-varying shocks (e.g., policies) on entry.47
In columns 5 and 6 we include city-country and rm-year xed e¤ects, which further absorb
exporterssupply shocks and any time-varying factors that a¤ect entry.48 We continue to obtain
a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction between the density and export growth of
44For instance, city-market xed e¤ects capture the European connection in Shanghai in the 1930s. Moreover,
simultaneity biases due to unobserved time-invariant factors are largely alleviated.
45By including country-year xed e¤ects, any learning e¤ects that can still be identied at the city level is due to
neighborsexport performance that deviates from the national average. For example, there can be a demand surge in
country m for a particular product that has been produced by neighboring exporters. This example ts the general
pattern that industries are highly geographically concentrated in China.
46The benet is that we can control for rm-year xed e¤ects, which cannot be done with a Probit model. The
well-known critique is that the relation explored can be non-linear. However, it has been shown extensively (see,
for example, Wooldridge, 2002 and Angrist and Pischke, 2009) that the average marginal e¤ects from the Probit
estimates are usually very close to the linear estimates.
47The coe¢ cient on the stand-alone density measure is marginally signicant, but now becomes negative. The
negative correlation could arise from competition in the factor markets, driving up the production costs for all rms.
If there is no market-specic information from those rms, competition from neighboring exporters may reduce entry.
48The number of observations per rm-year is the number of potential destinations that a rm considers entering
in a particular year. Given that new markets include all destinations that were served by neighbors but not the rm
itself, there is enough degree of freedom to identify the e¤ects within a rm-year.
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neighboring rms serving the same country from the same city. The coe¢ cients are also of similar
magnitude to those reported in columns 3 and 4. These results show that, conditional on its
capability and knowledge, a rm is more likely to enter a new market if it gets a positive signal from
neighbors about that market, and increasingly so if there are more neighbors revealing the signal.
Specically, the coe¢ cient of 0.449 on 100  4 ln (xcmt) in column 6 suggests that the (pooled)
sample mean export growth of neighbors exporting from city c to country m (20%) is associated
with a 0.1 percentage-point increase in the probability of entry into the market.49 The numbers
appear to be small, but as reported in Table 2, the median entry rate in a country (after averaging
across city-years) is about 0.3%.50 So a 20% higher growth rate of exports to a particular country
is associated with about a one-third increase in the export entry rate, evaluated at the median. In
addition, the coe¢ cient of 0.052 on the interaction term, 100 ln(ncm;t 1)4 ln (xcmt), suggests
that an increase in neighborsexport growth equal to the sample mean (20%) is associated with
an increase in the entry probability by 0.02 percentage points when the log density of neighbors
revealing the signal increases by one standard-deviation (that is, 1:7, or about 5 rms).51 This
corresponds to an increase of about 10% in the entry rate evaluated at the median entry rate in
the sample.
In the online appendix, we conrm the robustness of the results by measuring the prevalence of
neighbors by the (log) number of rms instead of the density (columns 1 and 2 of Table A4). We
also conduct further robustness checks by using the average export value of neighbors to market m
in year t, ln (xcmt), in year t  1, ln (xcm;t 1); and neighborsaverage export growth lagged by one
year, 4 ln (xcm;t 1), to proxy for the signal (columns 1 and 2 of Tables A5 and A6).52
There is no particular reason to impose a linear relationship when estimating Proposition 1. In
Table 4, we estimate specications that allow for non-linear relationships between the signal from
neighbors and the entry probability, by including quantiles of the density of neighbors interacted
with the signal. Specically, we divide city-markets into quantiles according to their ranking in the
density of neighboring exporters. We include dummies (Idenq) for di¤erent quantiles as well as their
interactions with the signal, 4 ln (xcmt). Columns 1 and 2 divide the sample into four quartiles of
neighbor density, whereas columns 3 and 4 further split the sample into ve quintiles. Columns
2 and 4 additionally include quantile dummies interacted with neighborsexport growth in other
markets. All specications control for rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. Results show that in
city-markets with high quantiles of density of neighbors, the entry probability is increasing in the
signal, but in low quantiles the relationship is insignicant. In particular, the cut-o¤ seems to be at
around the fourth quartile or quintile. When the sample is split into ve quintiles, results show that
490:20 0:449
100
.
50The way that we calculate the median entry rate is by rst taking the average of entry rates across rms and
years within the same city-country. Then we take the median of these averages for each country. Alternatively, we
can just take the average of the entry rates across rm-years for each country. The order of magnitudes of the entry
rates and thus the quantitive e¤ect of spillover remain similar.
510:052 0:201:697
100
= 0:00018, or 0:018 percentage points.
52We report results controlling for rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects in Tables A3-A6 for space considerations,
but results remain robust for other combinations of xed e¤ects included, as in Table 3.
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the probability of entering a market is increasing with the neighborssame-market export growth
mostly in the top 20% city-markets in terms of density of neighbors.53 In sum, by relaxing the
assumption of a linear relationship between the prevalence of neighbors and the learning e¤ects,
we still nd evidence supporting Proposition 1.
5.1.2 FirmsOwn Prior Uncertainty and Variability of Observed NeighborsExport
Performance
Proposition 2 states that a rms entry into exporting is less sensitive to its neighbors signal
if their export sales are more dispersed within a market, but is more sensitive if the rm itself
has less precise prior knowledge about the market. We now empirically examine the relationship
between the precision of the signal, the precision of the prior, and the learning e¤ects revealed
in export entry. Any robust results will provide conrming evidence that learning is a channel
through which neighboring export activities shape new exporters entry and post-entry export
performance. A rms less precise prior (higher vdm) can be interpreted as higher uncertainty
about the foreign market. Since a rmsinformation before entry is not available in the data, we
use both the geographic distance between the destination and China, and the extended gravity
measures, proposed by Morales et al. (2012), to proxy for the rms uncertainty about the new
market.54 The extended gravity variables capture the similarity between the new markets and those
previously served by the rm.55 The measures we use include indicators for whether a potential
new market shares the same language or the same border with any existing markets served by the
rm.
To measure the dispersion of signals (vzm), we adopt the conventional approach and use the
(log) standard deviation of neighborsexports in the same city-country-year cell. If heterogeneity
in neighborsexports is large, a rm will perceive the signal as noisy and will reduce the weight on
the signal when updating its prior. To empirically examine Proposition 2, we estimate the following
specication:
Pr [Entryicmt] = + 1 [V 4 ln (xcmt)] + 2V (13)
+ [ln(ncm;t 1)4 ln (xcmt)] +  ln(ncm;t 1)
+ 4 ln (xcmt) + Z 0 + fFEg+ icmt;
In addition to the three main variables of interest, ln(ncm;t 1)  4 ln (xcmt), 4 ln (xcmt), and
53F-tests cannot reject the null that the interactions with Iden1 and Iden2 are jointly equal to 0. F-tests, however,
reject the null that the interactions with Iden3, Iden4, and Iden5 are jointly equal to 0; as well as the null that the
interactions with Iden4 and Iden5 are equal to 0 individually.
54The assumption that information asymmetry is positively correlated with distance between countries is often
used in the trade and FDI literature, while the use of extended gravity measures has been recently used by Albornoz
et al. (2012) to study rmsexport dynamics.
55For example, if two rms are contemplating to export to the U.S., the one that had export experience to Canada
will have a more informed view about the U.S. market compared to those that have businesses in Asia. The U.S. and
Canada are not only close to each other, but both of them also use English as the o¢ cial language, share the same
border, and have similar income level per capita.
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ln(ncm;t 1), we add V and its interaction with 4 ln (xcmt), where V is either (i) a proxy for the
heterogeneity of the market signal, which varies across city-countries and time (cmt); (ii) a proxy for
the ex-ante uncertainty about demand in country m, which varies across countries (m); or (iii) the
rm-specic extended gravity measures, which vary across rm-country-years (icmt).56 According
to Proposition 2, the sign of the estimated 1 is expected to be negative for the rst measure;
positive for the second; and negative for the last, because a small learning e¤ect is expected when
the new markets are more similar to the markets currently served by the rm.
Table 5 reports the rst set of results from estimating (13). In column 1, we interact the
measure of vzmt, the (log) standard deviation of neighbors export growth to market m in year t,
with the signal, 4 ln (xcmt). The coe¢ cient on V 4 ln (xcmt) is positive and marginally signicant
(at the 5% level), in contrast with Proposition 2, which predicts less learning when the signal is
noisier. In column 2, we follow the same approach used in Table 4 by allowing for a non-linear
relationship between the signal inferred from neighbors and the entry probability. We divide city-
markets into quintiles according to their ranking of the standard deviation of neighbors export
growth in the sample.57 We then include the quintile dummies (IV q) and their interactions with
the signal, 4 ln (xcmt), along with the regressor included in the last column of Table 3. While the
estimated coe¢ cients on the quintile interactions are positive and statistically signicant, they are
not decreasing in quantile ranks, as is expected based on Proposition 2. Importantly, we continue
to nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of the density of neighbors on the entry learning e¤ects,
consistent with our ndings in Table 3.
In column 3, we explore the di¤erential learning e¤ects across destination markets, based on
their distance from China. From the specication in column 5 of Table 3, we additionally include
an interaction term between the (log) distance of country m from China and the signal measure.
We nd a positive and marginally signicant (at the 10% level) coe¢ cient on the interaction
term, lending some support to Proposition 2, which predicts that learning is stronger for markets
which rms are less familiar with. In column 4, we explore the potential non-linear relationship
between distance from China and learning, by including interactions between quintile dummies of
the distance and the signal. The coe¢ cients on all interaction terms are positive and signicant,
with the smallest coe¢ cient found on the rst quintile interaction and the highest found on the
fourth one. Though the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is not monotonically increasing in
quintile rank, the average of the coe¢ cients on the fourth and fth quintile interactions is larger
than the average of the rst three. The di¤erence is also statistically signicant.
We then investigate whether a rms previously served markets can a¤ect a new exporters prior
and shape its entry patterns. We use the extended gravity measures explained above to capture
market similarity. As reported in Table 6, when we use common o¢ cial language to group countries
(column 1), we nd supporting evidence that new exporters have less to learn from neighbors
about markets that are similar to the exporterspreviously served markets. The coe¢ cient on the
56Note that for the extended gravity measures, vicmt = 1 if rm i has served a country in year t   1 that is close
(in terms of one of the two criteria) to new market m in year t, and vicmt = 0 otherwise.
57We use the city-market sample rather than the rm sample to assign observations to quantiles.
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interaction between the signal and the indicator for whether the new market shares a common
language with any of the rms existing markets is negative and signicant. When we use the
common border criteria to dene country similarity, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is
positive but insignicant (column 2). Column 3 includes simultaneously interactions between the
signal and both the indicators for common language and common border. The interaction term
remains negative and signicant for language and insignicant for common boarder. In sum, results
from two of the three sets of regressions in Tables 4 and 6 support Proposition 2.
5.2 EntrantsInitial Sales
Next, we study the e¤ects of learning from neighbors on exportersinitial sales in a new market.
Proposition 3 states that new exportersinitial exports are increasing in the strength of the signal,
more so if it is revealed by more neighbors. To examine this proposition, we estimate eq. (12) but
with the entry dummy replaced by the (log) rm is initial exports to market m from city c in year
t, ln (xicmt), as the dependent variable. Table 7 reports the regression results. Di¤erent columns
correspond to specications with di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects, as explained in the previous section.
Across all specications, the coe¢ cients on both the neighborsaverage export growth and its
interaction with the density of neighbors are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The stand-alone density of neighbors measure is statistically insignicant. These results suggest
that exporters start with a larger order in a new market when the signal is stronger, especially
when it is revealed by more neighbors.58 Specically, in column 6 we control for rm-year and
city-market xed e¤ects, thus identifying the e¤ects within rm-years, controlling for city-market
characteristics. We also include variables for spillovers from neighboring rms that export to other
countries. In this specication, the estimated coe¢ cient on neighborsaverage export growth is
0.165, suggesting that if neighborsexports to a market grow at the sample mean rate (i.e., 20%), a
new exporters initial sales in the same market will be about 3.3% higher on average,59 relative to
markets with zero average neighborsexport growth. The estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction
term between the signal and the log density of exporters is 0.016, suggesting that based on the same
sample average export growth of neighbors, one standard-deviation increase in the (log) density of
neighbors exporting to a market (about 5 rms per squared mile) is associated with an additional
0.5% initial exports in the same market.60
The ndings in this section are consistent with Proposition 3 and also existing studies that
investigate why exporters tend to start small when exporting to a new market (Rauch and Watson,
2004; Albornoz et al., 2012). Our results suggest that neighboring market-specic export activities
reveal information about foreign demand, encouraging rms to enter a new market with a larger
order.
58Results remain robust when we measure the prevalence of neighbors by the log of their raw number (see columns
3 and 4 of Table A4). In particular, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the signal and the ln(number) of
neighbors is positive and statistically signicant.
590:165 0:20 100:
600:016 0:20 1:7 100
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5.3 Survival
Proposition 4 predicts that conditional on entry, a new exporters survival rate is increasing in the
strength of the signal revealed by neighborsexport activities, but is independent of the number
of neighbors. The reason is that while the number of neighbors a¤ects the number of entrants by
changing the entry threshold, conditional on entry, any ex ante information was already taken into
account by the entrant at the time of entry and will no longer a¤ect its exit decision.
To empirically examine this proposition, we construct the survival dummy as follows:
Survivalicm;t =
(
1 if xicm;t 1 = 0, xicm;t > 0; xicm;t+1 > 0
0 if xicm;t 1 = 0, xicm;t > 0; xicm;t+1 = 0
; (14)
That is, Survivalicmt equals 1 if the rm was not exporting to market m in year t   1, but
starts exporting in year t and continues in t + 1. If the rm exports in year t but not in t + 1,
Survivalicmt = 0. In the literature, Survivalicmt = 1 corresponds to successful export entrants,
while Survivalicmt = 0 are referred to as one-time or occasional exporters. We examine Proposition
3 by estimating eq. (12), but with the entry dummy replaced by Survivalicm;t as the dependent
variable. We use the same baseline proxy for signal and interaction terms as above. The results are
reported in Table 8. According to Proposition 4, there should be no relation between the number of
neighbors and the exit rate. However, the strength of the signal a¤ects entry and thus the sample
of new exporters. Thus, our model highlights the importance of controlling for rm xed e¤ects
to account for the potential selection bias. For comparison, we continue to use specications with
di¤erent combinations of xed e¤ects as above.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 control for city-country and country-year xed e¤ects, while columns
3 and 4 control for city-year and city-country xed e¤ects instead. The coe¢ cients on both the signal
term, 4 ln (xcmt), and its interaction with the log density of neighbors, ln(ncm;t 1) 4 ln (xcmt),
are statistically insignicant. Moreover, we obtain a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient
on ln(ncm;t 1), suggesting that an increased entry due to more neighboring exporters may lead to
more exits of the less productive ones ex post. All these results remain the same regardless of
whether we include controls to capture potential learning e¤ects from exporters to other countries
or not.
Columns 5 and 6 control for rm-year xed e¤ects, in addition to city-market characteristics.
In these specications, which account for selection by identifying the e¤ects from within rm-year
variation in survival, we obtain a positive and (marginally) signicant coe¢ cient on 4 ln (xcmt),
while that on ln(ncm;t 1)  4 ln (xcmt) is positive but insignicant. The empirical support for
Proposition 4 is weak at best. Importantly, we nd no signicant relation between the prevalence
of neighbors and survival, which is consistent with our prediction but contrasts with what has been
documented in the literature.
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5.4 Post-entry Growth
According to our model, the e¤ect of neighborsexport activities may also a¤ect new exporters
growth in the same market. Proposition 5 states that the post-entry growth rate, conditional on
survival, is decreasing in the signal about the foreign markets demand, increasingly so if there
are more neighboring rms revealing it. Intuitively, a more precise signal from neighbors about
foreign demand implies less surprises that the rm did not anticipate before entry, and thus a lower
post-entry export growth.
To examine Proposition 5, we rst dene the dependent variable, new-market export growth, as
4 ln (xicm;t+1) = ln (xicm;t+1)  ln (xicm;t). This growth rate is for sales in each new foreign market
by an exporter, conditional on surviving in the market into year t+ 1. We then estimate eq. (12)
but with 4 ln (xicm;t+1) as the dependent variable. Table 9 reports the results with di¤erent sets
of xed e¤ects included, as in the previous sections. We nd negative and statistically signicant
coe¢ cients on the three regressors of interest: the density of existing exporters serving a market
from the city, ln(ncm;t 1); the strength of the signal, 4 ln (xcmt); and the interaction between those
two variables.61 This suggests that export growth after entry in a market is decreasing in the
performance of existing exporters serving that market from the same city, and more so with a
higher density of neighbors. These results lend support to Proposition 5. In particular, in column
6 where we control for rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects, we obtain an estimated coe¢ cient
on the interaction term of -0.024. This suggests that in city-markets with an average growth of
neighbors exports (20%), a one standard-deviation increase in the density of neighbors lowers
post-entry export growth of a new exporter in the same market by about 1 percentage point.
5.5 Robustness Checks
We also perform several robustness checks for the analyses conducted so far. First, in addition to
city-country and rm-year xed e¤ects, we include country-year xed e¤ects in our regressions to
make sure that new exportersdynamics are not driven by country demand shocks, in addition to
rm supply shocks and city-country unobserved determinants of entry that we always controlled
for. Including simultaneously city-country, rm-year and country-year xed e¤ects, however, proves
computationally impractical for a sample with over 10 million observations. For this robustness
check, we restrict our sample to the textile sector (HS2 codes from 50 to 63), Chinas largest non-
processing export sector in terms of the number of exporting rms and export value. The results
for entry and initial sales, as reported in the rst two columns of Table A7 in the online appendix,
show that the coe¢ cients on both the stand-alone signal term and its interaction with the density
of neighbors remain positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The regression results for
post-entry growth (column 4) also remain largely robust, with negative and signicant coe¢ cients
obtained on both terms. In the survival specication (column 3), we obtain positive coe¢ cients on
both the interaction term and the stand-alone term for the signal, although insignicant.
61 In column (6), when we add the controls for spillover e¤ects from rms serving markets other than the one the
rm entered, the coe¢ cient on the stand-alone density term loses signicance.
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Another robustness check we conduct is to investigate whether new exporters learn from neigh-
bors located only in the same city or farther away as well. As reported in Table A8 in the online
appendix, we continue to nd that the entry probability and initial sales in a market increase in the
average performance of neighboring exporters in the same city, and more so with more neighbors
revealing the signal. There is also evidence of positive and statistically signicant spillover from
neighbors in the same province but outside the city. For survival, results also show evidence for
learning from neighbors that are farther away (column 3). However, results for post-entry export
growth (column 4) show no e¤ect from the performance of exporters located in the province but
outside the city.
In Table A9 in the online appendix, we compare the learning e¤ects between foreign-owned
versus domestic new exporters. The rst four columns study whether spillovers to new exporters in
a market di¤er depending on the ownership type (foreign-owned versus domestic) of the information
providers. Results for the coe¢ cients of interest remain robust in sign and signicance, for the four
measures of export performance, but the magnitude of spillover is larger from domestic exporters
than from foreign exporters, with the exception of post-entry growth. The last four columns of
Table A9 separately identify the learning e¤ects in four di¤erent directions domestic to domestic,
foreign to foreign, domestic to foreign, and foreign to domestic. For both ownership types of
recipients, the spillover e¤ect is strongest if the source is from existing domestic exporters. For
domestic recipients, the learning e¤ects are stronger from domestic exporters than from foreign
exporters. And for foreign recipients, with the exception of post-entry growth, the learning e¤ects
are also stronger from domestic exporters than from other foreign exporters. These ndings are
consistent with the hypothesis that foreign rms are more attentive in restricting the leakage of
trade secrets. Another reason is that foreign rms are more informed about foreign markets and
have less to learn from other foreign exporters.
6 Conclusions
Research in international trade shows that new exporters often start selling small quantities and
many of them give up exporting in the rst year. These ndings suggest high uncertainty facing new
exporters. Whereas existing research has focused on a rms own export experience in explaining
its future export dynamics and performance, we explore instead how neighborsexport activities
may matter.
We build a statistical decision model to study how learning from neighboring exporters a¤ects
exportersperformance and dynamics in new markets. A rm updates its expectation about the
demand of a new foreign market, using the weighted average between its prior and the demand level
inferred from neighboring exporters. How much a rm updates depends on several factors, including
the number of neighbors currently selling there, the level and heterogeneity of their export sales,
and the rms own prior knowledge about the market. Our model predicts that the probability
of entry and the level of initial sales in a new market are both increasing in the strength of the
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signal about the market, more so if it is revealed by more neighboring exporters. New exporters
decisions to exit are independent of the prevalence of neighboring export activities, whereas post-
entry export growth, conditional on survival, is decreasing in the strength and the precision of the
signal. We nd supporting evidence for these predictions using transaction-level trade data covering
all Chinese exporters over 2000-2006. We also nd that new exportersresponses to a positive signal
about foreign demand are decreasing in the rms prior knowledge about the market, proxied by
either the geographic distance between China and the destination, or the similarity between the
new market and the existing markets served by the rm.
Our results highlight an important source of learning to export, not from a rms own experience
but from its neighbors. The ndings shed light on an under-explored benet of agglomeration,
uncovered as reduced uncertainty facing new exporters. Available information from neighbors can
lower the cost of entry into foreign markets and the amount of turnover due to experimentation. For
simplicity we abstract from learning about ones production capability, as studied by Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003). A direction for future research is to examine how that may explain some of
the export dynamics documented in this paper. Another natural extension of our research is to
explore learning not only about demand in di¤erent countries, but also about demand for di¤erent
products.
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Figure 1: New Exporters - Fraction of Exporters and Survival Rate
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Figure 2: New Exporters - Fraction of Exporters and Average Initial Sales over Average Sales of
Existing Exporters
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Figure 3: (log) Export Volume from City c to Country m between Year t and t  1
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Figure 4: Number and Average Export Growth of Neighboring Exporters to the U.S. (Di¤erent
Cities)
Figure 5: The Rate of Entry into the U.S. Market (Di¤erent Cities)
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Table 1: Trade Patterns
Panel A: Firm level
Number of destinations
2001 2003 2005
Mean 5 6 6
Median 2 2 3
Stand. Dev 7 8 9
Exports (thousands US$)
Mean 1011 1258 1462
Median 196 251 298
Stand. Dev 8893 9926 13816
Panel B: Aggregate Level
Number of rms 27740 45471 82836
Number of destinations 173 182 195
Exports (US$ millions) 28044 57202 121102
Source: Authorscalculation based on Chinas Customs transaction-level trade data (2001-2005). Only non-processing
(ordinary) exporters are included.
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Table 2: Top and Bottom 10 Countries based on Average Export Entry Rates
Top 10
2001 2005
Country Entry Rate Country Entry Rate
Japan 0.171 United States 0.207
United States 0.161 Korea 0.136
Korea 0.133 Japan 0.133
Germany 0.087 Germany 0.120
Taiwan 0.086 United Kingdom 0.100
Singapore 0.084 Italy 0.098
Australia 0.077 Canada 0.095
United Kingdom 0.076 Australia 0.094
Italy 0.072 Taiwan 0.084
Canada 0.066 Spain 0.082
Bottom 10
2001 2005
Country Entry Rate Country Entry Rate 100 2  100 2
Mali 0.102 Monaco 0.054
Rwanda 0.097 Saint Lucia 0.053
Guyana 0.095 Niger 0.046
Uzbekistan 0.090 Antigua and Barbuda 0.040
Mozambique 0.087 Marshall Islands 0.038
Djibouti 0.086 St. Vincent & Grenadines 0.037
Somalia 0.084 Bermuda 0.030
New Caledonia 0.062 Solomon Islands 0.030
Albania 0.053 Somalia 0.023
Zambia 0.044 Lesotho 0.023
Source: Authorscalculation based on Chinas Customs transaction-level trade data. Hong Kong is excluded as a destination
in our sample. The entry rate of a country is computed as the average over all city-level entry rates for that country.
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Table 3: Export Entry and Learning from Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) 4 ln(xcmt) 0.0359*** 0.0325*** 0.0554*** 0.0659*** 0.0553*** 0.0520***
(4.63) (3.79) (7.06) (7.43) (7.04) (6.82)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] 0.309*** 0.268*** 0.477*** 0.556*** 0.476*** 0.449***
(4.71) (3.77) (7.24) (7.59) (7.21) (7.00)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) -0.0517 -0.0633*** 0.0640*** -0.0262 0.0623*** 0.004
(-0.27) (-3.26) (3.65) (-1.17) (3.53) (0.19)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t) 0.213*** -2.22 -2.45
(4.31) (-1.01) (-1.12)
4 ln(xc( m)t) 1.54*** -12.6 -7.48
(8.58) (-0.56) (-0.36)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac) 0.180*** -2.78** -2.93**
(2.69) (-2.09) (-2.21)
City-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 14,756,513 14,756,442 14,756,513 14,756,442 14,756,513 14,756,442
R-squared .0477 .0477 .0478 .0478 .102 .102
See eq. (12) for the estimation specication. All coe¢ cients are already multiplied by 100 for clearer reporting. The sample
excludes outlying city-countries, which have average neighborsexport growth above the 99th percentile or below the 1st
percentile of the year. Transactions to Hong Kong are also excluded. The dependent variable, Entryicmt, is equal to 1 for the
rm-city-country-year observation if rm i started exporting to country m in year t. Entryicmt is set to zero for all
destination countries that a new exporter did not export before and in year t. The source of spillover is measured by the (log)
number of same-marketneighboring exporters divided by the area of the city, ln(ncm;t 1=Areac). Columns (1) and (2)
include city-country and country-year xed e¤ects. Columns (3) and (4) include city-year and city-country xed e¤ects.
Columns (5) and (6) include rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the
city-country level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Entry and Learning from Neighbors (Quantile Dummy Interactions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Categorization quartile quartile quintile quintile
4 ln(xcmt) interacted with:
Iden1 0.0108 0.0194 -0.00247 0.00888
(0.81) (1.52) (-0.16) (0.59)
Iden2 -0.0169 -0.0105 0.00714 0.0104
(-1.42) (-0.95) (0.57) (0.88)
Iden3 0.0242 0.0211 -0.0230 -0.0130
(1.59) (1.40) (-1.54) (-0.90)
Iden4 0.206*** 0.168*** 0.0328* 0.0238
(7.34) (6.06) (1.76) (1.29)
Iden5 0.277*** 0.230***
(7.85) (6.62)
4 ln(xc( m)t) interacted with:
Iden1 -4.50 -4.53
(-0.25) (-0.25)
Iden2 -3.91 -3.98
(-0.22) (-0.22)
Iden3 -2.79 -3.36
(-0.15) (-0.19)
Iden4 -1.81 -2.40
(-0.10) (-0.13)
Iden5 -1.61
(-0.09)
Quantile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 14,756,513 14,756,513 14,756,513 14,756,513
R-squared .102 .102 .102 .102
All coe¢ cients are already multiplied by 100 for clearer reporting. The sample excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) of
neighborsexport growth and export transactions to Hong Kong. The dependent variable, Entryicmt, is equal to 1 for the
rm-city-country-year observation if rm i started exporting to country m in year t. Entryicmt is set to zero for all
destination countries that a new exporter did not export before and in year t. City-markets-years are put into di¤erent
quantile bins, based on their ranking of density of neighbors exporting to the same market in a year. Dummies for di¤erent
quantiles are included as well as their interactions with the growth rate of neighborsexports to the same market.
Even-numbered columns also include quantile dummies interacted with neighborsexport growth in other markets. All
columns include rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the city-country
level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
40
Table 5: Entry and Learning from Neighbors (Heterogeneous E¤ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty Measure (V ) (log) Std. Dev. Exp Growth (log) Distance
V 4 ln(xcmt) 0.0869** 0.0287*
(2.09) (1.71)
4 ln(xcmt) interacted with:
IV 1 0.924*** 0.545***
(5.85) (6.81)
IV 2 0.977*** 0.552***
(6.33) (7.17)
IV 3 0.994*** 0.567***
(6.56) (7.00)
IV 4 1.00*** 0.595***
(6.56) (6.72)
IV 5 1.03*** 0.570***
(6.38) (7.16)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac)4 ln(xcmt) 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.0667*** 0.0672***
(6.61) (6.32) (7.11) (7.01)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] 0.979*** 0.303*
(6.67) (1.88)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) -0.0618 -0.0289 -0.0467** -0.0468**
(-1.20) (-0.56) (-1.97) (-1.97)
Vcmt 0.00960
(0.38)
Additional Controls 4 ln(xc( m)t) interacted with IV 1, IV 2 ... IV 5 in col 2 & 4;
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac), 4 ln(xc( m)t);
and ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t)
Quintile dummies interacted w/
signal to other countries n/a Yes n/a Yes
Quintile dummies n/a Yes n/a Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of obs. 10,403,464 10,403,464 13372087 13372087
R-squared .111 .111 .104 .104
See eq. (13) for the estimation specication. All coe¢ cients are already multiplied by 100 for clearer reporting. The sample
excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) of neighborsexport growth and export transactions to Hong Kong. The dependent
variable, Entryicmt, is equal to 1 for the rm-city-country-year observation if rm i started exporting to country m in year t.
Entryicmt is set to zero for all destination countries that a new exporter did not export before and in year t. In column (2),
city-market-years are split into quintiles of the standard deviation of neighborsexport growth in the same year, with IV 1
being the lowest quintile. In column (4), city-markets are split into quintiles of distance between the destination and China in
the pooled sample. Quintile dummies are included as well as their interactions with the growth rate of neighborsexports to
the same market. Also included are quintile dummies interacted with neighborsexport growth in other markets. All columns
include rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the city-country level, are
reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Entry, Learning from Neighbors, and Extended Gravity
(1) (2) (3)
Ilang;t 4 ln(xcmt) -0.123*** -0.162***
(-4.70) (-6.07)
Ilang;t -2.08*** -2.51***
(-22.03) (-20.75)
Iborder;t 4 ln(xcmt) 0.0713* 0.0593
(1.65) (1.27)
Iborder;t 0.0253*** 0.0248***
(48.33) (27.28)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac)4 ln(xcmt) 0.0705*** 0.0681*** 0.0688***
(6.85) (6.66) (6.68)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] 0.654*** 0.595*** 0.642***
(7.50) (6.91) (7.38)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) 0.0884*** 0.0648** 0.0737***
(3.27) (2.42) (2.75)
Additional Controls Ilang;t 4 ln(xcmt) in col 1 & 3;
Iborder;t 4 ln(xcmt) in col 2 & 3;
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac), 4 ln(xc( m)t),
and ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t)
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 7,102,425 7,102,425 7,102,425
R-squared .0755 .0756 .0774
See eq. (13) for the estimation specication. Only exporters that were selling in other markets in year t-1 are included. The
sample excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) and transactions to Hong Kong. All coe¢ cients are already multiplied by 100 for
clearer reporting. The dependent variable, Entryicmt, is equal to 1 for the rm-city-country-year observation if rm i started
exporting to country m in year t. Entryicmt is set to zero for all destination countries that a new exporter did not export
before and in year t. The source of spillover is measured by the (log) number of same-marketneighboring exporters divided
the area of the city, ln(ncm;t 1=Areac). Column (1) uses language as the basis to group countries. Column (2) uses the fact
that an existing country and the new country served by the rm share the same border. Column (3) includes both extended
gravity measures and their corresponding interactions. All columns include the extended gravity dummies interacted with the
neighborsgrowth rate in other countries, neighbors export growth and its interaction with the corresponding prevalence, as
well as rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the city-country level, are
reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: Initial Sales and Learning from Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) 4 ln(xcmt) 0.0125*** 0.0114*** 0.0163*** 0.0162*** 0.0158*** 0.0157***
(2.92) (2.67) (3.79) (3.78) (3.26) (3.22)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] 0.148*** 0.133*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.166*** 0.165***
(4.60) (4.18) (5.45) (5.43) (4.62) (4.57)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) -0.0814*** -0.0463*** -0.00708 -0.0213 0.00930 0.00256
(-7.30) (-4.10) (-0.62) (-1.62) (0.75) (0.18)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t) -0.0147 0.152 0.0671
(-0.79) (0.78) (0.21)
4 ln(xc( m)t) 0.0633 3.317 1.124
(0.77) (0.35) (0.23)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac) -0.199*** -0.320* -0.178
(-7.64) (-1.87) (-0.83)
City-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 513433 513402 513433 513402 513433 513402
R-squared .102 .102 .105 .105 .546 .546
See equation (12) for the estimation specication. The sample excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) and transactions to Hong
Kong. The dependent variable is ln(ExpSales)icmt. The source of spillover is measured by the (log) number of
same-marketneighboring exporters divided by the area of the city, ln(ncm;t 1=Areac). Columns (1) and (2) include
country-year and city-country xed e¤ects. Columns (3) and (4) include city-year and city-country xed e¤ects. Columns (5)
and (6) include rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the city-country
level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: Export Survival and Learning from Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) 4 ln(xcmt) 0.0129 -0.0640 -0.134 -0.0591 0.145 0.185
(0.11) (-0.55) (-1.24) (-0.55) (1.21) (1.53)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] 0.0856 -0.629 -1.13 -0.575 1.22 1.51*
(0.10) (-0.72) (-1.41) (-0.72) (1.38) (1.70)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) -8.87*** -8.54*** -7.63*** -6.84*** -4.95*** -4.52***
(-30.12) (-27.12) (-23.78) (-18.52) (-14.49) (-11.45)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t) 0.501 16.5** 12.2*
(1.06) (2.09) (1.72)
4 ln(xc( m)t) 5.25** 87.0 -91.8
(2.38) (0.32) (-0.75)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac) -2.06*** 14.5*** 8.86*
(-2.90) (3.34) (1.79)
City-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 513433 513402 513433 513402 513433 513402
R-squared .0702 .0702 .0742 .0742 .588 .588
See equation (12) for the estimation specication. The sample excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) and transactions to Hong
Kong. All coe¢ cients are already multiplied by 100 for clearer reporting. The dependent variable, Survivalicmt, equals 1 for
a new exporter that survived the rst year and continued to export in the second year. It is equal to zero if a new exporter
exported only for 1 year. The source of spillover is measured by the (log) number of same-marketneighboring exporters
divided by the area of the city, ln(ncm;t 1=Areac). Columns (1) and (2) include country-year and city-country xed e¤ects.
Columns (3) and (4) include city-year and city-country xed e¤ects. Columns (5) and (6) include rm-year and city-country
xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the city-country level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10;
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: Post-entry Export Growth and Learning from Neighbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) 4 ln(xcmt) -0.0256*** -0.0320*** -0.0297*** -0.0298*** -0.0241*** -0.0237***
(-4.68) (-5.72) (-5.49) (-5.45) (-3.08) (-3.00)
4 ln(xcmt) [signal] -0.346*** -0.397*** -0.380*** -0.381*** -0.325*** -0.321***
(-8.67) (-9.71) (-9.65) (-9.56) (-5.75) (-5.66)
ln(ncm;t 1=Areac) -0.0574*** -0.0553*** -0.0677*** -0.0561*** -0.0452** -0.0149
(-4.17) (-3.80) (-4.42) (-3.22) (-2.16) (-0.62)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac)4 ln(xc( m)t) 0.0788*** -0.180 -0.343
(3.75) (-0.62) (-0.78)
4 ln(xc( m)t) 0.434*** 0.0612 -3.387
(4.53) (0.00) (-0.12)
ln(nc( m);t 1=Areac) -0.0230 0.241 0.743**
(-0.73) (1.19) (2.36)
City-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Country-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Firm-year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
City-country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb of Obs. 248424 248411 248424 248411 248424 248411
R-squared .0589 .0589 .0627 .0626 .512 .512
See equation (12) for the estimation specication. The sample excludes outliers (dened in Table 3) and transactions to Hong
Kong. The dependent variable is post-entry export growth, ln(ExpSalest+1)  ln(ExpSalest). The source of spillover is
measured by the (log) number of same-marketneighboring exporters divided by the area of the city, ln(ncm;t 1=Areac).
Columns (1) and (2) include country-year and city-country xed e¤ects. Columns (3) and (4) include city-year and
city-country xed e¤ects. Columns (5) and (6) include rm-year and city-country xed e¤ects. t statistics, based on standard
errors clustered at the city-country level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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